What Is It Like To Be in a Pure Perceptual State?
Análisis Filosófico November 8, 2024 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1042 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Pure perceptual states Nonconceptual content Iconic format Phenomenally peculiar |
| Key points | Argues that the idea of pure perception, defined as nonconceptual, iconic, and phenomenologically unique, is untenable due to lack of empirical support from introspection, psychology, and neuroanatomy. |
Abstract
The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states.