Skip to content

Evaluating Panpsychism

Sergio Cermeño-aínsa

Crítica (México D F En línea) December 17, 2025 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1748 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Possibility theory Interpretation philosophy Information theory Metatheory Epistemology
Key points Argues that weak emergent panpsychism and panprotopsychism, alone or combined, show potential for panpsychism to remain coherent and viable.

Abstract

In this article, I evaluate which version of panpsychism is best suited to address the challenges faced by a theory of consciousness. I first argue that a panpsychist theory is more likely to be successful if it meets two conditions: (1) it must be compatible with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and (2) it must provide at least a preliminary indication of how to solve the combination problem. I consider three main versions of panpsychism: constitutive panpsychism micropanpsychism and cosmopanpsychism), emergent panpsychism (strong and weak), and panprotopsychism (panqualitivist and panexperientialist). I conclude that weak emergent panpsychism, together with the two variants of panprotopsychism (panqualitivism and panexperientialism), or a combination of these approaches, shows genuine potential for panpsychism to remain a coherent and viable position.