Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
November 13, 2025
Albert Newen, Carlos Montemayor
2 citations
The evolution of consciousness is a neglected topic that plays a surprisingly insignificant role in all major theories of consciousness. Furthermore, substantial disagreements can be observed in the dominant views on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), which focus too much on cortical brain regions. In order to dissolve some of the contradictions among these views and to constrain...
Journal of Consciousness Studies
March 31, 2023
Albert Newen, Carlos Montemayor
8 citations
The scientific investigation of consciousness generates new findings at a rapid pace. We argue that we need a novel theoretical framework, which we call the ALARM theory of consciousness, in order to account for all central observations. According to this theory, we need to distinguish two levels of consciousness, namely basic arousal and general alertness. Basic arousal functions as a specific...
Cognition
February 21, 2023
Leonard Dung, Albert Newen
The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive...
Frontiers in Psychology
November 23, 2018
Albert Newen
Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position held by Metzinger (2003, 2009) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self (Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008) which is primarily an...
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Albert Newen, Shaun Gallagher, Leon De Bruin
129 citations
Abstract The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer...