The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind
Frontiers in Psychology November 23, 2018 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02270 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractHuman self-consciousness requires presupposing a self, but not a fixed metaphysical substance or a purely narrative entity. Instead, an embodied self—flexible and variable—is necessary, best accounted for by a pattern theory of the self. Self-consciousness arises from integrating an embodied, basic affective flow with an intentional object, such as the self as agent or center of imagination, anchored in this embodied self. The pattern theory fits within the predictive coding framework, where self-representation and world-representation develop in parallel, always activated together when interacting with the world.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Medicine Psychology Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that an embodied self, described through a pattern theory, is necessary for self-consciousness and that self- and world-representation develop in parallel within the predictive coding framework. |
Abstract
Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position held by Metzinger (2003, 2009) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self (Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast to these theories, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self, although this is not a metaphysical substance, nor an entity for which stable necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be given. Self-consciousness results from an integration of an embodied, basic affective flow with an intentional object (the self as agent or as center of imagination or thought), where this integration remains anchored in an embodied self. This embodied self is a flexible and variable entity, which we can account for only with a pattern theory of the self (in line with Gallagher, 2013). Furthermore, I outline how this pattern theory of the self fits into the predictive coding framework, which also answers the open question whether self-representation is prior to world-representation or the other way around. The principal organization of a mechanism of building up a self-model is such that both types of representations are always activated and developed in parallel. Modeling oneself is a process which is always activated when one interacts with the world – much as a shadow is present when a person walks in the sun.