4E Cognition
Albert Newen, Shaun Gallagher, Leon De Bruin
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 129 |
| Key points | Proposes that the traditional metaphysical understanding of constitution in 4E cognition is being challenged and that the role of mental representations requires an independent analysis. |
Abstract
Abstract The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.