ISSN 2330-4014
5 papers in the library · 2 citations · publishing 2023-2026
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy March 2, 2026 Paweł Jakub Zięba
Relationalism about perception (aka naïve realism) construes the phenomenal character of conscious perception as at least partially constituted by the perceived items. According to the “austere” forms of this view, perceiving does not consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Instead, austere relationalists maintain that representing a perceived item occurs in response...
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy May 27, 2025 Wen Qiang Chen, Xiaoxing Zhang 1 citation
Mystical religious experiences typically purport to engage with the transcendent and often claim to involve encounters with spiritual entities or a detachment from the material world. Daoism diverges from this paradigm. This paper examines Daoist mystical experiences of bodily transformations and explores their epistemological implications. Specifically, we defend the justificatory power of...
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy May 27, 2025 Takuya Niikawa
Does consciousness have non-instrumental aesthetic value? This paper answers this question affirmatively by arguing that consciousness is sublime. The argument consists of three premises. (1) An awe experience of an object provides prima facie justification to believe that the object is sublime. (2) I have an awe experience about consciousness through introspecting three features of...
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy November 26, 2024 Yibin Liang 1 citation
It is well known that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (or, approximately, inner sense). However, Kant sometimes claims that “I think,” the general expression of transcendental apperception, expresses an indeterminate empirical inner intuition (IEI), which differs in crucial ways from the empirical inner intuition...
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy November 17, 2023 Martin A. Lipman
The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can moreover ‘adopt’...