The Nonrelational Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness Defended
J. Berger, Joseph Gottlieb
American Philosophical Quarterly July 1, 2026 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.63.3.03 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the higher-order theory of consciousness, when conscious states are understood as appearances that may exist only notionally, is workable despite objections of incoherence, by observing an ambiguity in expressions such as ‘appearance’. |
Abstract
According to higher-order (“HO”) theories, consciousness consists in HO awareness of being in mental states. While many objections to such theories have been addressed elsewhere, the most well-known seems to remain: the problem of so-called “empty” HO states, which holds that HO theory cannot explain cases wherein one is aware of mental states that do not exist. This paper offers a novel characterization of the classic HO theory, on which conscious states are appearances and so may exist only notionally. Though some critics allege this view is incoherent, we argue that the theory is workable by observing an ambiguity in expressions such as ‘appearance’. We thus aim not only to address this objection, but also to clarify how this HO theory operates.