Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, by Uriah Kriegel.

Abstract

The idea that conscious states are about both the world and themselves is an old one, tracing its roots back to Brentano and perhaps even as far back as Aristotle. There is, according to this picture, an intrinsic reflexiveness at the heart of conscious experience. In his important and provocative book Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Uriah Kriegel approaches this venerable idea with the sophisticated tool-kit of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. He develops an intricate case for a naturalistic self-representational theory of consciousness — one that, if successful, explains phenomenal consciousness without a residual explanatory gap, provides a satisfying account of the rich phenomenology of conscious experience, and avoids the pitfalls plaguing rival naturalistic accounts of consciousness. The book offers a detailed defence of Kriegel's theory and much more besides. Kriegel has something interesting to say about many of the debates over mind and consciousness, even if some of his arguments are admittedly impressionistic first-takes. There is a systematic sweep to Kriegel's approach, even if all the blanks are not filled in yet. Kriegel offers chapters on the phenomenology, ontology, and science of consciousness, as well as a novel solution to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. With this in mind, I cannot do justice to all that transpires in Subjective Consciousness. I will by necessity restrict my focus to the heart of the book, Kriegel's self-representational theory and the arguments he offers for it. And while my substantive comments will be largely critical, I wish to stress that the book is an important contribution to the study of consciousness, and that even if it fails to establish its ambitious goals, the debate is productively advanced. This is success indeed in the tangled thickets of consciousness studies.