The Hard Problem and Qualitative Inaccuracy
Routledge eBooks June 28, 2023 DOI: 10.4324/9781003411581-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Presents Chalmers's five arguments for pessimism about the hard problem, which the author says rest on first-person access to consciousness. Introduces Pereboom's "qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis"—that we might be seriously mistaken about the nature of our conscious states—as a key step in an optimistic debunking argument, and proposes "type-Q" materialism, motivated by Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, to frame the debate in naturalistic terms. |
Abstract
This chapter presents in detail the main reasons offered for a pessimistic belief in the hard problem, notably the five central arguments offered by David Chalmers. These arguments are rooted in our first-person access to consciousness, and they provide the central line of justification for our problem intuitions about consciousness. The chapter then introduces Derk Pereboom’s “qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis,” which holds that it’s a serious possibility that we might be in error about the nature of our conscious states. Defending the plausibility of this hypothesis is a key step in the optimistic debunking argument. Finally, the chapter presents “type-Q” materialism—a view motivated by Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction—to help better frame the debate in naturalistic terms.
Comparable studies
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| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |