The illusion of reality: how (not) to think of hallucination
Søren Overgaard, Laura Oppi, Kasper Møller Nielsen, Mads Gram Henriksen
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences June 20, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-026-10181-z (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Illusion Visual hallucination Phenomenology philosophy Auditory hallucination Meaning existential Cognitive psychology Key lock Class philosophy Epistemology Delusion |
| Key points | Argues that a satisfactory definition of hallucination must be based on a clarified understanding of 'sense of reality' and 'perception-like' experience. |
Abstract
Abstract It is surprisingly difficult to provide an account of hallucination that captures all the cases that clinicians typically class as hallucinations, without at the same time admitting cases that would not typically be classed as such. Most attempts to specify exactly what a hallucination is supposed to be fails to meet at least one of these conditions, as we show in the first part of the paper. We then proceed to develop an account of hallucination that meets both conditions. Central to this account is a discussion of two key notions in much need of clarification: the notion that hallucinations have a ‘sense of reality’, and the notion that hallucinations are ‘perception-like’. Settling on the exact meaning of these two notions allows us to offer an account of hallucination that captures all cases typically classified as hallucination and only such cases.