Mind as “E”nteraction: Towards the Complexity Hypothesis
Inês Hipólito, Paul van Geert, Luiz Pessoa
March 17, 2023 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/2dtp6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that psychological phenomena are best understood through an integrated framework combining embodiment, enactment, and dynamical systems, which the authors call the "Complexity Hypothesis." Proposes that bridging psychological behavior and neural activity via complex systems theory can highlight their mutual influence and provide a basis for future cognitive science research. |
Abstract
This paper explores the brain-behavior relationship, integrating embodiment, enactment, and dynamical processes. The classical dynamical hypothesis offers a mathematical framework for describing state space trajectories. These abstract processes benefit from understanding systems as embodied and enactive – what we shall call the Complexity Hypothesis. Reconciling dynamics and embodiment remains a challenge. We analyze psychological phenomena and apply complex systems theory to elucidate psychological enactive dynamics. We then bridge the gap between psychological behavior and neural activity to highlight the mutual influence and affection between these levels of abstraction providing a basis for future research in cognitive science.
Citations in the library
Cites 4
- Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content Philosophical Psychology July 9, 2018
- Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science Australasian Philosophical Review April 3, 2018
- Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System. Frontiers in Psychology January 12, 2022
- Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis Adaptive Behavior February 1, 2015