Does consciousness even appear unified?
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift December 12, 2023 DOI: 10.18261/nft.58.4.4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Phenomenal unity Integrated information theory Appearance-reality Bevissthet |
| Key points | Argues that the assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified is not justified, challenging theories like Integrated Information Theory that depend on this premise. |
Abstract
Abstract In the debate about phenomenal unity, the assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified is generally taken for granted. Based on this, most debates have focused on whether consciousness is in fact unified or whether it merely appears to be. Here, I object to the premise of this debate by questioning the assumption that the way consciousness appears to us suggests it is unified. One upshot of this objection is that theories or arguments that presume phenomenal unity are challenged. I illustrate this by discussing the impact of my objection on the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness.