Does consciousness even appear unified?
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift December 12, 2023 DOI: 10.18261/nft.58.4.4 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe author challenges the widely held assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified to us. While most debates assume that consciousness seems unified and then ask whether it really is, this paper questions that starting point. The author argues that the way consciousness appears does not necessarily suggest it is unified. This objection undermines theories and arguments that rely on phenomenal unity as a premise. The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness is discussed as an example of a theory that is affected by this challenge.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Phenomenal unity Integrated information theory Appearance-reality Bevissthet |
| Key finding | Argues that the assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified is not justified, challenging theories like Integrated Information Theory that depend on this premise. |
Abstract
Abstract In the debate about phenomenal unity, the assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified is generally taken for granted. Based on this, most debates have focused on whether consciousness is in fact unified or whether it merely appears to be. Here, I object to the premise of this debate by questioning the assumption that the way consciousness appears to us suggests it is unified. One upshot of this objection is that theories or arguments that presume phenomenal unity are challenged. I illustrate this by discussing the impact of my objection on the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness.