Theories of Consciousness and the Selection Problem
Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy June 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2026-0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that theories of consciousness must address the "selection problem": explaining which unconscious states are fed into a consciousness-rendering mechanism. Proposes that clarifying the selection mechanism involves specifying the parameters and factors (e.g., different kinds of properties) that determine which unconscious states are selected. |
Abstract
Abstract Central parts of the debate between theories of consciousness concern the proposed mechanism rendering a previously unconscious state X conscious. Here, I introduce a question that comes immediately before, namely why it is X – rather than some other unconscious state Y – that gets to enter the mechanism and become conscious. This is the selection problem: accounting for the mechanism that selects which unconscious states are fed as input to a proposed consciousness-rendering mechanism. Given that there is a host of unconscious states (things I could experience next) that could enter the consciousness rendering mechanism, there is a line at the door, so to speak. Accounting for the selection mechanism involves clarifying the parameters under which the doorman operates. Doing this involves considering what are the factors involved in the selection process, where factors could e.g. be different kinds of properties. I briefly elaborate on such factors and give examples from different domains. Finally, I consider some implications and offer potential avenues of future research.