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Axel Cleeremans

50 papers in the library · 152 citations · publishing 1998-2026

Papers

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Consciousness as something that the brain learns to do

The Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association September 11, 2019 Axel Cleeremans, Wen Wen

Starting from the radical idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than a static property associated with some patterns of neural activity and not with others, I explore the links between theory of mind, self- awareness, and perceptual awareness. Considering first the link between self-awareness and perceptual awareness, I suggest, congruently with the...

The role of levels of processing in disentangling the ERP signatures of conscious visual processing.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2019 Monika Derda, Marcin Koculak, Bert Windey et al.

We aimed to distinguish electrophysiological signatures of visual awareness from other task-related processes through manipulating the level of processing of visual stimuli. During an event-related EEG experiment, 36 subjects performed either color (low-level condition) or magnitude (high-level condition) evaluations of masked digits. Participants also assessed subjective visibility of each...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102767 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Awareness Consciousness Contrastive analysis EEG +4

Opportunities and challenges for a maturing science of consciousness

Nature Human Behaviour February 1, 2019 M. Michel, Diane M Beck, Ned Block et al.

Scientific research on consciousness is critical to multiple scientific, clinical, and ethical issues. The growth of the field could also be beneficial to several areas including neurology and mental health research. To achieve this goal, we need to set funding priorities carefully and address problems such as job creation and potential media misrepresentation.

The levels of perceptual processing and the neural correlates of increasing subjective visibility.

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2017 Marek Binder, Krzysztof Gociewicz, Bert Windey et al.

According to the levels-of-processing hypothesis, transitions from unconscious to conscious perception may depend on stimulus processing level, with more gradual changes for low-level stimuli and more dichotomous changes for high-level stimuli. In an event-related fMRI study we explored this hypothesis using a visual backward masking procedure. Task requirements manipulated level of processing....

Hypnosis and top-down regulation of consciousness.

Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews February 4, 2017 Devin B. Terhune, Axel Cleeremans, Amir Raz et al.

Hypnosis is a unique form of top-down regulation in which verbal suggestions are capable of eliciting pronounced changes in a multitude of psychological phenomena. Hypnotic suggestion has been widely used both as a technique for studying basic science questions regarding human consciousness but also as a method for targeting a range of symptoms within a therapeutic context. Here we provide a...

Spontaneous eyeblinks during breaking continuous flash suppression are associated with increased detection times.

Journal of Vision November 1, 2016 Filip Van Opstal, Esther De Loof, Tom Verguts et al.

An eyeblink has a clear effect on low-level information processing because it temporarily occludes all visual information. Recent evidence suggests that eyeblinks can also modulate higher level processes (e.g., attentional resources), and vice versa. Despite these putative effects on different levels of information processing, eyeblinks are typically neglected in vision and in consciousness...

Consciousness as a graded and an all-or-none phenomenon: A conceptual analysis.

Consciousness and Cognition September 2015 Bert Windey, Axel Cleeremans

The issue whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon has been and continues to be a debate. Both contradictory accounts are supported by solid evidence. Starting from a level of processing framework allowing for states of partial awareness, here we further elaborate our view that visual experience, as it is most often investigated in the literature, is both graded and...

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings.

Consciousness and Cognition July 2014 Michał Wierzchoń, Borysław Paulewicz, Dariusz Asanowicz et al.

We compare four subjective awareness measures in the context of a visual identification task and investigate quantitative differences in terms of scale use and correlation with task performance. We also analyse the effect of identification task decisions on subsequent subjective reports. Results show that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy for all scale types, although the type of...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.009 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Confidence ratings Feeling of warmth Perceptual awareness scale Post-decision wagering +1

The graded and dichotomous nature of visual awareness.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences March 17, 2014 Bert Windey, Astrid Vermeiren, Anne Atas et al.

Is our visual experience of the world graded or dichotomous? Opposite pre-theoretical intuitions apply in different cases. For instance, when looking at a scene, one has a distinct sense that our experience has a graded character: one cannot say that there is no experience of contents that fall outside the focus of attention, but one cannot say that there is full awareness of such contents...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2013.0282 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Humans Awareness Consciousness Visual perception +6

Repeating a strongly masked stimulus increases priming and awareness.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2013 Anne Atas, Astrid Vermeiren, Axel Cleeremans

Previous studies [Marcel, A. J. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15(2), 197-237; Wentura, D., & Frings, C. (2005). Repeated masked category primes interfere with related exemplars: New evidence for negative semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(1), 108-120]...

Subjective visibility depends on level of processing.

Cognition November 2013 Bert Windey, Wim Gevers, Axel Cleeremans

Is visual awareness graded or binary? Experimental work has provided support for both possibilities, leading to two coexisting but contradictory theoretical accounts. Here we propose a promising candidate factor through which to integrate both accounts: the depth of stimulus processing required by the task. We compared color identification (a low-level task) with numerical judgements (a...

Subjective measures of consciousness in artificial grammar learning task.

Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2012 Michał Wierzchoń, Dariusz Asanowicz, Borysław Paulewicz et al.

Consciousness can be measured in various ways, but different measures often yield different conclusions about the extent to which awareness relates to performance. Here, we compare five different subjective measures of awareness in the context of an artificial grammar learning task. Participants (N=217) expressed their subjective awareness of rules using one of five different scales: confidence...

Higher order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-description process.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences May 1, 2012 Bert Timmermans, Leonhard Schilbach, Antoine Pasquali et al.

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0421 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Brain Humans Consciousness Models, neurological +3

Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2011 Kristian Sandberg, Bo Martin Bibby, Bert Timmermans et al.

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as...

Statistical learning of two artificial languages presented successively: how conscious?

Frontiers in Psychology 2011 Ana Franco, Axel Cleeremans, Arnaud Destrebecqz

Statistical learning is assumed to occur automatically and implicitly, but little is known about the extent to which the representations acquired over training are available to conscious awareness. In this study, we focus on whether the knowledge acquired in a statistical learning situation is available to conscious control. Participants were first exposed to an artificial language presented...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00229 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Consciousness Implicit learning Process-dissociation procedure Statistical learning

Measuring consciousness: is one measure better than the other?

Consciousness and Cognition December 2010 Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, Morten Overgaard et al.

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their...

Know thyself: metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness.

Cognition November 2010 Antoine Pasquali, Bert Timmermans, Axel Cleeremans

Subjective measures of awareness rest on the assumption that conscious knowledge is knowledge that participants know they possess. Post-Decision Wagering (PDW), recently proposed as a new measure of awareness, requires participants to place a high or a low wager on their decisions. Whereas advantageous wagering indicates awareness of the knowledge on which the decisions are based, cases in...

Optimizing subjective measures of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition June 2010 Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg et al.

Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes...

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action.

Consciousness and Cognition September 2008 Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Haggard

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the...

Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis.

Progress in Brain Research 2008 Axel Cleeremans

In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties...

Consciousness and metarepresentation: a computational sketch.

Neural Networks November 1, 2007 Axel Cleeremans, Bert Timmermans, Antoine Pasquali

When one is conscious of something, one is also conscious that one is conscious. Higher-Order Thought Theory [Rosenthal, D. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] takes it that it is in virtue of the fact that one is conscious of being conscious, that one is conscious....

Time, action, and consciousness.

Human movement science April 2007 Axel Cleeremans, Jean-Christophe Sarrazin

Time plays a central role in consciousness, at different levels and in different aspects of information processing. Subliminal perception experiments demonstrate that stimuli presented too briefly to enter conscious awareness are nevertheless processed to some extent. Implicit learning, implicit memory, and conditioning studies suggest that the extent to which memory traces are available for...

Consciousness: converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 1, 2005 Tiago V Maia, Axel Cleeremans

Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective attention, working memory and cognitive control involve competition between widely distributed representations. This competition is biased by top-down projections (notably from prefrontal cortex), which can selectively enhance some representations over others. This view has now been...

Implicit learning: news from the front.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 1, 1998 Axel Cleeremans, Arnaud Destrebecqz, M Boyer

Can we learn without awareness? While the current consensus is most likely to be `no', there is, however, considerable ongoing debate about the role that consciousness plays in cognition and about the nature of consciousness itself. In this article, we review recent advances in the field of implicit learning, based on three perspectives: empirical findings (including neuropsychological...

Making 'sense' of agency: the bodily self has a time and place

Debbie Margaretha Louisa De Boer, Patrick Johnston, Farhang Namdar et al. preprint

How does the brain distinguish between the signals it produces and the sensations it registers from the environment? To shed light on this, it was investigated if the human mind could be capable of perceiving an avatar’s body in a third person game as one’s own. To create precise, high-quality motion simulations, we uniquely combined a Virtual Reality-setup (Valve Index) with real-time motion...