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Bert Timmermans

7 papers in the library · publishing 2007-2014

Papers

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Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings.

Consciousness and Cognition July 2014 Michał Wierzchoń, Borysław Paulewicz, Dariusz Asanowicz et al.

We compare four subjective awareness measures in the context of a visual identification task and investigate quantitative differences in terms of scale use and correlation with task performance. We also analyse the effect of identification task decisions on subsequent subjective reports. Results show that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy for all scale types, although the type of...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.009 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Confidence ratings Feeling of warmth Perceptual awareness scale Post-decision wagering +1

Higher order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-description process.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences May 1, 2012 Bert Timmermans, Leonhard Schilbach, Antoine Pasquali et al.

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0421 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Brain Humans Consciousness Models, neurological +3

Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2011 Kristian Sandberg, Bo Martin Bibby, Bert Timmermans et al.

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as...

Measuring consciousness: is one measure better than the other?

Consciousness and Cognition December 2010 Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, Morten Overgaard et al.

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their...

Know thyself: metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness.

Cognition November 2010 Antoine Pasquali, Bert Timmermans, Axel Cleeremans

Subjective measures of awareness rest on the assumption that conscious knowledge is knowledge that participants know they possess. Post-Decision Wagering (PDW), recently proposed as a new measure of awareness, requires participants to place a high or a low wager on their decisions. Whereas advantageous wagering indicates awareness of the knowledge on which the decisions are based, cases in...

Optimizing subjective measures of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition June 2010 Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg et al.

Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes...

Consciousness and metarepresentation: a computational sketch.

Neural Networks November 1, 2007 Axel Cleeremans, Bert Timmermans, Antoine Pasquali

When one is conscious of something, one is also conscious that one is conscious. Higher-Order Thought Theory [Rosenthal, D. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] takes it that it is in virtue of the fact that one is conscious of being conscious, that one is conscious....