We challenge Seth's claim that simulations of consciousness necessarily lack the causal powers or intrinsic properties of real consciousness. We argue that Seth's position risks begging the question against computational functionalism and faces a dilemma over the reducibility of qualia. This weakens his case, leaving open the possibility that simulations could, in principle, realize consciousness.
Abstract Fleming and Michel’s hypothesis about the origins of consciousness not only faces multiple challenges but also overlooks phenomenal experience—the very phenomenon that needs explaining. Although we are in broad agreement with the authors’ overall perspective, we highlight challenges and suggest that consciousness evolved to attribute subjective value, enabling organisms to care about...
DC. Dennett (2020,personal communication) asked: 'How do we go from doing things for reasons to having reasons for doing things?'. This question targets a fundamental shift in nature: while all organisms act in the way they do for reasons that are shaped by extrinsic evolutionary cost functions, some also act for reasons of their own, even engaging in behaviour that may be detrimental to their...
The predictive processing framework has gained significant popularity across disciplines investigating the mind and brain. In this article we critically examine two of the recently made claims about the kind of headway that the framework can make in the neuroscientific and philosophical investigation of consciousness. Firstly, we argue that predictive processing is unlikely to yield significant...