This paper asks: if large language models (LLMs) gave rise to phenomenal consciousness, what would it be like? I argue that if LLMs gave rise to phenomenal consciousness, it would be like being an impartial, improvising playwright rather than a character or a (roleplaying) actor or an author writing a first-personal narrative. My argument has three steps. I first argue that if LLMs give rise to...
Rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities has drawn fresh attention to the prospect of consciousness in AI. There is an urgent need for rigorous methods to assess AI systems for consciousness, but significant uncertainty about relevant issues in consciousness science. We present a method for assessing AI systems for consciousness that involves exploring what follows from...
We develop a taxonomical framework for classifying challenges to the possibility of consciousness in digital artificial intelligence systems. This framework allows us to identify the level of granularity at which a given challenge is intended (the levels we propose correspond to Marr's levels) and to disambiguate its degree of force: is it a challenge to computational functionalism that leaves...
medRxivNovember 11, 2024Sophia G Girgenti, Isabella Dallasta, Erin Lawrence et al.
preprint
Well-developed rehabilitation paradigms exist for post-stroke language and motor impairments. However, no such recovery program has been identified for commonly disabling cognitive deficits in patients following minor stroke. Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) is thought to engage the frontal lobes, improving concentration and attention, and therefore may be an effective option. We...
Conscious states-state that there is something it is like to be in-seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information...
Claims that an AI system "instantiates" a consciousness- or cognition-theoretic construct are often supported by a cheap correlate: aggregate dependence read as irreducible integration, ordinary shared-store efficiency read as global access, or a confidence-labelled signal read as metacognitive monitoring. Such inferences trade on a construct's appearance while omitting the property that...
Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of...