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Sydney Shoemaker

5 papers in the library · 14 citations · publishing 1993-2003

Papers

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Functionalism and qualia

Identity, Cause, and Mind September 4, 2003 Sydney Shoemaker

Abstract In their paper “What Psychological States are Not” N. J. Block and J. A. Fodor raise a number of objections to the ‘functional state identity theory’ (FSIT), which says that “for any organism that satisfies psychological predicates at all, there exists a unique best description such that each psychological state of the organism is identical with one of its machine states relative to...

Absent qualia are impossible - a reply to Block

Identity, Cause, and Mind September 4, 2003 Sydney Shoemaker

Abstract In his recent paper “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” (hereafter AAQI),1 Ned Block attempts to rebut an argument I gave for an affirmative answer to his title question in my paper, “Functionalism and Qualia” (hereafter F&Q).2 The issues raised by this controversy go far beyond the question of whether a particular argument of mine is successful. The question of what account we are to give...

The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

September 13, 1996 Sydney Shoemaker

Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends...

Colors, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia

Philosophical Issues 1996 Sydney Shoemaker 12 citations

Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that subjective reactions must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a or representational character, and that is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience....

Lovely and Suspect Ideas

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993 Sydney Shoemaker, Daniel C. Dennett 2 citations

is so much that is brilliant, delightful, and right in Dennett's book that it is tempting try explain away, or sweep under the rug, the things that seem wrong. I was aware of one long standing disagreement between him and me, namely over the existence of But I had hoped that this was an isolated case. And, indeed, the book a whole presents a vision of mind and its place in nature (to steal C....