Consciousness cannot be separated from function.
Michael A Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett
Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Animals Humans Brain mapping Consciousness Models, biological |
| Key points | Argues that any neurobiological theory of consciousness built on a division between experience and function cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. Proposes a notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing inaccessible conscious states, and outlines criteria for a falsifiable theory of consciousness. |
Abstract
Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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