This paper explores one way of putting selves and values back into the world. I analyze Charles Taylor’s, Iris Murdoch’s, and Donald Walhout’s arguments showing that to be a self is to relate to being as a value. I show that the intentional relation of world-directedness that is central to self discloses being first as a value. I argue that our best account of what it is to be a self commits us...
Le present article interprete la lecture heideggerienne de la phenomenologie de l'esprit de Hegel comme une critique voilee de la phenomenologie de la conscience de Husserl. Je defends l'idee qu'en dernier ressort, Heidegger affirme l'insuffisance des deux phenomenologies, exclusivement preoccupees par l'etre ou les etants, et montre la voie pour une troisieme phenomenologie, celle de la...
Herder developed a very powerful and influential philosophy of mind. He was the source of Hegel’s famous threefold distinction between subjective, objective, and absolute mind (or Geist). Concerning the fundamental mind–body question he wavered between neutral monism and materialism, but developed a theory that has marked advantages over rival theories such as dualism, mind–brain identity, and...
Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures...
What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter...
In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, I shall argue that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be...
For people living with multiple sclerosis (MS), one's own body may no longer be taken for granted but may become instead an insistent presence. In this article, we describe how the body experience of people with MS can reflect an ongoing oscillation between four experiential dimensions: bodily uncertainty, having a precious body, being a different body, and the mindful body. People with MS can...
Qualitative research methodologies focus on meaning and although use similar methods have differing epistemological and ontological underpinnings, with each approach offering a different lens to explore, interpret or explain phenomena in real-world contexts and settings. In this article, we provide a brief overview of phenomenology and outline the main phenomenological approaches relevant for...
The hard problem of consciousness is the question how subjective experience arises from brain matter. I suggest exploring the possibility that quantum physics could be part of the answer. The simultaneous unity and complexity of subjective experience is difficult to understand from a classical physics perspective. In contrast, quantum entanglement is naturally both complex and unified. Moreover...
Religious experience and the experiential dimension of religious practice have come to constitute a fruitful area of enquiry for anthropology. This entry discusses the phenomenological school of philosophy as a source for the anthropology of religion. Concepts from this school that have been taken up within the anthropology of religion, such as bracketing, intentionality, embodiment, and...