Skip to content

Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity

Susi Ferrarello

Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19594 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Intentionality Signitive acts
Key points Raises the questions of what a practical, specifically evaluating, intention is, whether values are representational states distinct from epistemological truths, and whether perceptual experiences are representational. Proposes dividing the inquiry into the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the objectivity of value, drawing on Husserl's Ideas and Analyses.

Abstract

What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to the objectivity of a value. The texts I will refer to are Husserl’s Ideas and Analysis.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics