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25 results for "Meta-analysis: What did research on Philosophy of mind find in January 2026?"

From function to freedom: enactivism between being and becoming

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences January 24, 2026 Marius Werz

Abstract Enactivism is undergoing a metaphysical shift. In pursuit of a more open-ended account of organismic becoming, several theorists have turned to the “affirmationist” ontologies of Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze. These frameworks conceive becoming as a non-teleological process in which identities emerge as contingent actualizations of pre-individual fields. In this paper, I argue...

Trivialisms about Explanatory Gap

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy January 19, 2026 Cong Chen

Abstract A spectre of anti-physicalism haunts philosophy of mind: we seem unable to explain how the phenomenal arises from the physical. Rather than repeat clichés about the profundity of this explanatory gap, in this paper, I defend a set of Trivialisms, which suggest the phenomenal explanatory gap may not be as special as widely assumed. I start with surveying Schaffer’s modest Trivialism,...

Operationalizing near‑death experiences: Stability of the NDE Rasch hierarchy over two decades.

Consciousness and Cognition January 18, 2026 Marieta Pehlivanova, Rense Lange, Bruce Greyson et al.

This study presents the first comprehensive psychometric comparison of Greyson's (1983) 16-item Near-Death Experience Scale (NDE Scale) and Martial et al.'s (2020) 20-item Near-Death Experience Content Scale (NDE-C) using Rasch modeling and differential item functioning (or response bias) analyses. A total of 705 self-identified "near-death experiencers" (64% women) completed both measures,...

The Blessing of Memory Loss: Toward a Sacred Phenomenology of Forgetting

New Advances in Brain & Critical Care January 16, 2026 Julian Ungar-Sargon

There is a strange mercy in the way the mind forgets a mercy that medicine has rarely understood. In our age of biomedical triumphalism, where pharmaceutical companies spend billions on Alzheimer's therapies promising to rewind the unrewindable, we speak of memory loss exclusively as catastrophe, as the progressive erasure of selfhood requiring aggressive intervention. This article proposes a...

Beyond the Hard Problem: Integrating Philosophy, Neuroscience, and AI in Consciousness Research

International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) January 10, 2026 Mumun Das.

This article synthesises recent advances in consciousness studies by integrating contemporary philosophical debates, neuroscientific findings, and emerging discourse on artificial intelligence. It critically addresses philosophical issues, including qualia, the Hard problem, panpsychism, and illusionism, in juxtaposition with empirical neuroscientific theories such as Global Workspace Theory...

Expanding Microphenomenology: The Researcher-as-Obstacle Approach to Continuous Phenomena

January 8, 2026 Raphaël Julliard, Damien Roy, Marion Botella preprint

Investigating phenomena that practitioners experience as continuous, without clear beginning or end, poses a challenge for standard micro-phenomenology, which reconstructs short, bounded episodes retrospectively. This article introduces the Researcher-as-Obstacle (RAO) framework and protocol as a structural adaptation for such cases. RAO organizes a pretext experience that genuinely mobilizes...

Building science and subjectivity from flesh. Towards a reconceptualization of neurophenomenology as a contribution to interdisciplinary health research

Medicine Health Care and Philosophy January 6, 2026 Harald A. Wiltsche, Kristin Zeiler

Radical neurophenomenology offers new ways to re-thinking subjectivity and objectivity, and the relation between them. More specifically, radical neurophenomenology crucially relies on the notion of constitution to circumvent the pitfalls that were associated with older, dualistic frameworks. Building on existing work, our paper has two primary goals. First, we will argue that Merleau-Ponty's...

Dreaming and mind wandering: Spontaneous thought across the sleep-wake cycle. Editorial introduction

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences January 5, 2026 Jennifer Windt, Manuela Kirberg, Tomas Andrillon

This special issue unites original theoretical and empirical research on two topics that are gaining traction in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, but so far have small philosophical footprints: dreaming and waking mind wandering. While the fields of dream and mind wandering research are largely separate, phenomenological and neurophysiological similarities between waking mind wandering...

Scientific Method, Complexity and Phenomenology in Human Knowledge

Systems Research and Behavioral Science January 4, 2026 Felix Lebed

ABSTRACT The classical scientific method, particularly its deterministic approach, encounters limitations when attempting to fully capture the complexities of human beings. Although many 20th‐century philosophers criticized this method, their arguments were primarily philosophical. I see a need for a critique of the scientific method grounded in empirical science itself. The complexity paradigm...

Making sense of "senseless actions" in relation to criminal insanity.

Frontiers in Psychiatry 2026 Søren Esben Rytter Heilskov, Julie Nordgaard, Unn Kristin Haukvik et al.

In the assessment of criminal insanity, delusions play a particularly important role, because they express reality judgments, which, due to their verbalized form, serve well as "evidence" of psychosis. However, psychosis, understood as a fundamentally impaired sense of reality, can also involve disturbances that are neither verbalized nor inferential, but mainly enacted. In this paper, we...

A Phenomenology of Recognition in Psychosocial Interventions for Psychosis

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2026 Lukas Iwer-Docter

The concept of recognition has recently been introduced into the philosophy of psychiatry, particularly through Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed, to discuss the demand for recognition by mental health activists. This paper complements this perspective with a first-person approach, that is, a phenomenological perspective on recognition using the example of psychosocial interventions for psychosis. For...

Comparing the characteristics of hallucinations and mental imagery: a large cross-sectional study in the general population.

Consciousness and Cognition 2026 Guillaume Pepin, Hélène Lœvenbruck, Alan Chauvin et al.

Hallucinations (HAs), the perceptual experiences that occur without external stimuli, are classically associated with psychiatric disorders, but also occur in the general population. Involuntary mental imagery (IMI), the spontaneous occurrence of visual or auditory mental content, shares several features with HAs. The continuum hypothesis suggests that these phenomena exist on a spectrum...

Theoretical Perspectives on the Minimal and Narrative Self in the Schizophrenia Spectrum: An Integrative Review.

Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science 2026 Florestan Delcourt, Henry R Cowan, Jordan Sibéoni et al.

The self and its disorders in schizophrenia have been studied extensively over recent decades. Much of this literature is grounded in a bipartite understanding of the self, distinguishing the pre-reflective, minimal self from the reflective, narrative self. However, few studies have systematically examined the links between disturbances at these two levels of self. This integrative review...

Mutually Beneficial Artificial Consciousness

Artificial General Intelligence 2026 Oisín Hugh Clancy

We outline a research agenda for mutually beneficial artificial consciousness (MBAC): Artificial intelligence (AI) whose own subjective experience is positive and whose behaviour enhances human and non-human flourishing. Our starting point is the notion of beneficial states of consciousness (BSC)–qualitatively valued mind states such as kindness, joy, clarity, and non-duality–which we group...

Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation

Artificial General Intelligence 2026 Robert Prentner

Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria – S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent),...

The nature of mind scale (NOMS): Validation of an eight-dimensional scale assessing beliefs about the relationship between mind and matter.

Consciousness and Cognition 2026 Matthias Forstmann, Pascal Burgmer

We developed and validated the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS), a 24-item measure assessing lay beliefs about eight distinct philosophical positions on the mind-body relationship. Given the limitations of existing measures and the theoretical diversity of mind-body positions, our goal was to develop a comprehensive yet practical scale that could capture the full range of philosophical stances...

Felt Presence and Psychosis Risk in the General Population.

Psychopathology 2026 Tatiana Baxter, Sohee Park 1 citation

Felt presence (FP) is the experience that another entity is present in one's proximal environment, despite no sensory evidence. Occurrence of FP is linked to psychosis risk, but qualities of FP in the context of psychosis are not well understood. We conducted an online, exploratory survey assessing qualities of FP in relation to psychosis risk in the general population. Three hundred and...

Phenomenology of Hallucinations in Endogenous and Substance-Related Exogenous Psychoses.

Psychopathology 2026 Valerio Ricci, Massimiliano Aragona, Giuseppe Maina et al. 1 citation

Healthcare professionals encounter challenges in discerning endogenous and exogenous, drug-related, psychopathological phenomena. This study aimed to explore qualitative differences between hallucinations in schizophrenia and two forms of substance-related psychosis. These are substance-induced psychosis (SIP), which has an acute onset and is usually transient, and substance-related persistent...

Phenomenology of the stream of thought: dissociable dynamic dimensions revealed through experience sampling.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2026 Sneha K S Sheth, Mike Doswell, Kalina Christoff Hadjiilieva et al.

The pursuit of a scientific theory of consciousness has gained momentum in neuroscience over the past 25 years. While much research has centered on perceptual consciousness, the dynamic experience of the stream of thought, proposed by William James over a century ago, has remained relatively underexplored. The Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) introduced a taxonomy of thought dynamics,...

Illuminating consciousness.

Frontiers in Psychology 2026 Conor H. Murray, Kafui Dzirasa, Dana W. Sawyer et al.

What consciousness is, and how it relates to the body and nature at large, are among the most enduring questions in human history. Notable thinkers have long grappled with its definition, mechanisms, and purpose. In this review, we examine both historical and contemporary perspectives on consciousness across philosophy, science, medicine, and practice. By integrating diverse perspectives and...

Teoria da Consciência Relacional (TCR v3.2): Gesto da Carne, Limiar de Qualia e Dissolução do Hard Problem

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) 2026 Santos Oliveira da Silva Samuel

A Teoria da Consciência Relacional (TCR v3.2) propõe uma abordagem não-dualista para a consciência, dissolvendo o Hard Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) ao rejeitar tanto o dualismo substancialista quanto o reducionismo computacional e o panpsiquismo. A consciência emerge do gesto da carne — a urgência pré-reflexiva e vulnerabilidade irredutível de organismos vivos — em acoplamento...

Consciousness Between Fact and Value: A Triadic Neurophenomenology

OSF Preprints 2026 Kenneth Hammat

This project hosts materials related to the paper: Hammat, K. (2026). Consciousness Between Fact and Value: A Triadic Neurophenomenology. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18669043 For citation purposes, please cite the Zenodo DOI above. The paper introduces a novel triadic neurophenomenological framework that integrates neuroscience with embodied and phenomenological perspectives to...

Conscious simultaneity with continuous motion: a measure-theoretic resolution of the hard problem.

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2026 John Sanfey

This paper addresses the problem of integrating phenomenal consciousness with physical laws by seeking to identify and define its function. The central claim is that the hard problem is caused by the same epistemic paradox that makes quantum and classical physics mutually incompatible: the measure-theoretic limit. It is logically impossible to explain the mechanism by which state transitions...