Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists’ preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem

Abstract

The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely thought to be in the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). This article argues that this creates a challenge for HOT: current neuroimaging evidence and functional considerations suggest that, if PFC activity is constitutive of consciousness, it enables the consciousness of content represented in visual areas rather than supplying the content itself. The conclusion will be that HOT research should focus more on developing the version in which the first-order state supplies the content of visual experience.