Two neural correlates of consciousness
Trends in Cognitive Sciences January 13, 2005 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe search for a single neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) may be misguided. Evidence increasingly supports a framework with at least two distinct NCCs: a phenomenal NCC and an access NCC. These can be distinguished using experimental methods such as signal-detection theory. Recent cognitive neuroscience findings provide empirical support for two separate NCCs rather than one.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Cognitive science Cognition Cognitive neuroscience Cognitive psychology |
| Citations | 715 |
| Key finding | Argues that a framework with two distinct neural correlates of consciousness—phenomenal NCC and access NCC—better explains empirical results than a single NCC model. |
Abstract
Neuroscientists continue to search for "the" neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal-detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.