Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness
Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu
Croatian Journal of Philosophy June 7, 2022 DOI: 10.52685/cjp.22.64.5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the problem of targetless higher-order states for higher-order theories of consciousness can be addressed by reconceiving higher-order states as predictive states within the predictive processing framework, thereby understanding their emergence as non-random. |
Abstract
According to higher order (HO) theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious when there is a HO state about it. However, some HO states do not seem to be about other existing mental states. It is possible to resolve this problem since targetless HO states resemble HO states that misrepresent but the assumption that HO states always target other existing mental states is at odds with the theory since HO states are not only necessary but also sufficient for phenomenal consciousness according to the theory. Given the sufficiency of the HO states for consciousness, there is a need to understand the emergence of HO states as a non-random phenomenon to avoid the difficulties caused by targetless HO states. I suggest it is possible to develop such an understanding by thinking of HO states as predictive states in accordance with the predictive processing theory of the mind.
Citations in the library
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