Sensing Qualia.
Paul Skokowski
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 2022 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Behaviorism Consciousness Grounded functionalism Identity theory Integrated information theory Qualia Sensation |
| Citations | 9 |
| Key points | Proposes that interpreting the senses as physical detectors, within a new theory called Grounded Functionalism, can account for qualia while retaining multiple realizability. |
Abstract
Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind-Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory-will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 14
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- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account. December 1, 2012
- Why Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience Entropy November 27, 2019
- Integrating information in the brain's EM field: the cemi field theory of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020
and 9 more in the library