Qualia Compression
Lieven Decock, Igor Douven
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research July 1, 2013 DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00545.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a newly defined variant of color qualia inversion, termed "color qualia compression," could in principle go undetected and therefore escapes the standard objections to inversion arguments, supporting full skepticism about knowledge of other people's color experiences. |
Abstract
Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full‐blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences.