Qualia and Sensory Content
Anti-Externalism November 13, 2008 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four claims: sensory contents are qualia, experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and intentionalism is the correct account of the semantic contribution of these experiences. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, that these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and that intentionalism is the correct account of the semantic contribution of these experiences. It considers contrary externalist arguments, including arguments rooted in the claim of Williamson and Harman that knowledge is a basic mental state, in Kant's Refutation of Idealism, and in disjunctivism.