On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038309 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that including representational content within phenomenal content, even if only in certain spatial cases, obscures the distinction between phenomenal experience and cognitive function, and may exclude some modular theories, though it is interestingly suggestive of the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind. |
Abstract
Abstract One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.