PHENOMENAL AND INTENTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Igor’ Vladimirovich Cherepanov
Manuscript August 19, 2019 DOI: 10.30853/manuscript.2019.8.11 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness cannot be reduced to the intentional aspect, because the same intentional object can be represented by different phenomenal content and the same phenomenal content can represent different intentional objects. From this the author concludes that physicalist ontology is false. |
Abstract
The article discusses the phenomenal and intentional aspects of consciousness. The problem of phenomenal consciousness existence in the physical Universe is stated, since the emergence of non-intentional content contradicts the principle of the epistemological completeness of physics. In this regard, the concepts of representationalism and separatism are compared. Arguments are adduced in favour of the separatist point of view, which asserts the heterogeneous nature of mental experience. It is demonstrated that, firstly, one and the same intentional object can be represented by different phenomenal content and, secondly, one and the same phenomenal content can represent different intentional objects. Hence, the conclusion is made about the non-reducibility of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness to the intentional one and, as a consequence, about the falsity of physicalist ontology.