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Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness

Bernard J. Baars

Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038218 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Block's distinctions about consciousness are empirical questions that cannot be resolved pretheoretically, as demonstrated by examples from visual perception and word meaning representation.

Abstract

AbstractBlock seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.

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