Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038218 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe abstract argues that questions about consciousness—such as whether it is a single phenomenon or a collection of loosely related problems, and whether personal conscious experience is tightly linked to global cognitive access—cannot be settled by theoretical reasoning alone; they require empirical investigation. The author illustrates this by pointing to readers' own introspective experiences, such as the difference between central and peripheral vision, and the contrast between conscious and unconscious processing of a word's multiple meanings.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Block's distinctions about consciousness are empirical questions that cannot be resolved pretheoretically, as demonstrated by examples from visual perception and word meaning representation. |
Abstract
AbstractBlock seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.