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An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?

Joseph E. Bogen

Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x97000058 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Block's hypothesized zombie, as an example of access consciousness without phenomenal consciousness, may correspond to the disconnected right hemisphere of a split-brain subject.

Abstract

Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a “zombie,” computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?

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