An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?
Joseph E. Bogen
Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x97000058 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Block's hypothesized zombie, as an example of access consciousness without phenomenal consciousness, may correspond to the disconnected right hemisphere of a split-brain subject. |
Abstract
Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a “zombie,” computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?
Citations in the library
Cites 12
- How can we find the neural correlate of consciousness? Trends in Neurosciences November 1, 1996
- Fallacies or analyses? Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Triangulating phenomenal consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent? Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
and 7 more in the library