What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness
Philosophical Psychology 1993 DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573084 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 70 |
| Key points | Argues that three accounts of direct reflective awareness—mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory, and appendage theory—explain the same phenomenon in fundamentally different ways. Contends that appendage theory must solve how a direct reflective awareness succeeds in being awareness of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object, and proposes that psychologists studying consciousness are most likely to be attracted to appendage theory. |
Abstract
The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e. awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental‐eye theory, self‐intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental‐occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awareness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 40
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003
- Higher‐order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- The path not taken Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
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