The Objective Sense of Visual Experience and the Inadequacy Claim
June 5, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198998990.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Intentionality Argument complex analysis Component thermodynamics Visual perception Intersection aeronautics Action physics Epistemology Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Object grammar Relation database |
| Key points | Argues that spatial perception's objective sense is not fully captured by its explicit component, and that horizonal intentionality is needed to account for how visual experiences present three-dimensional objects. Connects this to the underdetermination problem in perceptual psychology. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter applies the Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality to spatial perception, that is our visual experiences as of three-dimensional objects. It details what the ‘objective sense’ of spatial perception amounts to and how the explicit component falls short of that sense. This involves a detailed discussion of what the explicit component of spatial perception consists in. The chapter also includes detailed discussion of various issues at the intersection of contemporary philosophy of perception and phenomenology. It closes by connecting the discussion to the 'underdetermination problem' in perceptual psychology.