The Argument for Transcendental Idealism at the Level of Pre-Objective Perceptual Experience
Avner Baz
The Problem of "The World" October 7, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197862148.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the 'phenomenal world' of pre-objective perceptual experience makes essential reference to the embodied subject and is therefore no more 'a world in itself' than the objective world. Contends that the objection that transcendental idealism claims we create empirical facts misfires, since it concerns the sense things make to us, not their existence. |
Abstract
Abstract: Still focusing on magnitudes, this chapter extends the transcendental idealist argument to the level of pre-objective perceptual experience. Following Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, it argues that ‘the phenomenal world’—the world as perceived and responded to, or engaged with, prior to becoming (if and when it does) the object of true or false representations—makes essential reference to the embodied subject and therefore is no more ‘a world in itself’ than is the objective world, or the world as objectively understood and represented. The chapter then responds to a recurrent objection to transcendental idealism, which attributes to it the patently absurd idea that we create, or bring into existence, empirical facts. That objection misfires, it argues, since transcendental idealism concerns not the existence of things, but the sense they make to us—both in pre-objective perceptual experience, and as objects of true or false empirical representations, or constituents of facts.