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Visual Phenomenology

Michael Madary

The MIT Press September 21, 2017 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035453.001.0001 (opens in new tab)

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Vision is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. The book argues for this claim on two grounds: descriptive evidence from first-person experience shows that vision is perspectival, temporal, and indeterminate, and that surprise occurs when appearances do not change as expected; empirical evidence from perceptual psychology, neuroscience (including predictive coding), and the two-visual-systems hypothesis supports modeling vision as anticipation and fulfillment. The book also addresses methodological questions and the link between visual perception and social cognition, with an appendix on Husserlian phenomenology.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Argues that visual perception is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment, supported by both phenomenological description and empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience.

Abstract

The main argument of the book is as follows: (1) The descriptive premise: The phenomenology of vision is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. (2) The empirical premise: There are strong empirical reasons to model vision using the general form of anticipation and fulfillment. (AF) Conclusion: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. The book consists of three parts and an appendix. The first part of the book makes the case for premise (1) based on descriptive claims about the nature of first-person experience. The initial support for (1) in Chapter 2 is based on the fact that visual experience has the general features of being perspectival, temporal, and indeterminate. Chapter 3 includes an argument for (1) based on the possibility of surprise when appearances do not change as we expect, and Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the content of visual anticipations. The second part of the book focuses on empirical support. Chapter 5 covers a range of evidence from perceptual psychology that motivates premise (2). Chapter 6 turns to evidence from neuroscience, including recent work in predictive coding. The seventh chapter shows how evidence for the two-visual systems hypothesis can be re-interpreted in support of (2). The third part of the book turns to general methodological questions (Chapter 8) and the relationship between visual perception and social cognition (Chapter 9). The appendix addresses the ways in which Husserlian phenomenology relates to the main theme of the book.

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