Intentionality and Perception (I)
Howard A. Robinson
Perception and Idealism November 17, 2022 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192845566.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that intentionalism cannot account for the presentational character of sense experience—the seeming presence of an object before one—without appealing to qualia or sense-data, and that this failure is demonstrated in this and the following chapter. |
Abstract
Abstract Brentano said that intentionality is the mark of the mental; that is, mental states are about, or reach out towards, their ‘object’, which may or may not exist. Someone can believe in fairies, though there are no fairies. Can the same model be applied to perception and sensation? Certainly, one can seem to see an elephant and there be no elephant, if one is, for example, hallucinating. But what about the status of the elephant-shape and colour? If I believe in fairies, their fairiness and whatever colour and shape I attribute to them—if any—are in the same situation, all being represented in thought. But bed-rock sense experience involves, not merely representation, but presentation, that this is the seeming presence of the object before one. Surely something constitutes this presentational nature which is not present in the case of thought or belief. Can the intentionalist cope with this extra element while avoiding qualia or sense-data? The argument of this and the next chapter is that he cannot.