Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception
European Journal of Philosophy June 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12705 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | The author reconstructs four arguments from Husserl's writings for the claim that perceptual experience is "inadequate"—that it presents objects partly in a non-sensory mode, such as an object's out-of-view surfaces—and critically evaluates them, aiming to showcase the variety and sophistication of Husserl's reasoning while also problematizing the idea that perceptual experience is inadequate. |
Abstract
AbstractOne key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non‐sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surface in a sensory mode and, as part of the same perceptual experience, also that object's out‐of‐view surface in a non‐sensory mode. To the extent that perceptual experience makes things available to us in a non‐sensory mode, Husserl calls it inadequate. Here, I reconstruct four arguments for the conclusion that perceptual experience is inadequately found in various of Husserl's writings and critically evaluated them. My aim is both to showcase the variety and sophistication of Husserl's reasons for thinking perceptual experience is inadequate and to problematize that idea.