Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception
Jérôme Dokic, Jean-Rémy Martin
Topoi June 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-015-9327-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Sense of presence Sense of reality Sense of acquaintance Derealization Parkinson’s disease Virtual reality Metacognitive feeling Naïve realism Intentionalism |
| Key points | Argues that the sense of reality is an affective experience akin to a metacognitive feeling, independent of spatial and sensory contents, and that this supports Naïve Realism over Intentionalism in explaining the specificity of perception. |
Abstract
We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from the spatial and sensory contents of experience. We suggest that the sense of reality is an affective experience akin to a metacognitive feeling. Finally, we present a potentially important implication of our account for the current debate between Intentionalism and Naïve Realism. Since perception is “opaque” with respect to the reality of what is perceived, Intentionalism cannot refer to the sense of reality as what differentiates perception from sensory-like experiences such as imaginings. In contrast, Naïve Realism has an independent explanation of the specificity of perception.