How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists
Dialogue September 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217317000440 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that HOT theory can adequately explain how higher-order thoughts engender the seeming that one is in a conscious state, thereby addressing Mulder's objection. |
Abstract
According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.
Citations in the library
Cited by 7
- Constructing a Scientific Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
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- Non-Relational Versions of Traditional Higher-Order Theories Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
- Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
- The Traditional Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
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Cites 6
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- A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness Dialogue September 1, 2016
- Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences May 1, 2012
and 1 more in the library