A Critical Assessment of the Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness

David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory holds that a mental state becomes conscious when a subject has a higher-order thought about being in that state. This dissertation defends HOT theory against two contemporary alternatives: the wide intrinsicality view of Rocco Gennaro and the complex self-representationalism of Uriah Kriegel. The author argues that, despite objections from both philosophers, there is not enough reason to reject Rosenthal's original theory.

Study at a glance

Abstract

David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory is a theory of state consciousness. The HOT theory posits that a form of higher-order awareness is required for a subject to be conscious of the mental states they bear. Higher-order awareness on this theory takes the form of a thought. The driving force behind the theory is the intuition that a conscious state is a state that a subject is aware of themselves as being in. The wide intrinsicality view advocated by Rocco Gennaro and ‘complex’ self-representationalism advocated by Uriah Kriegel are contemporary alternatives to Rosenthal’s HOT theory. The central thesis presented in this dissertation argues that, despite objections presented by both Gennaro and Kriegel, we are not given sufficient reason to abandon Rosenthal’s HOT theory.