A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
Jesse M. Mulder
Dialogue September 1, 2016 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217316000597 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that higher-order theories of consciousness rely on a notion of 'seeming' they cannot explain: treating it as present in all representational states trivializes it, extending the higher-order strategy to capture it yields an infinite regress, and accounting for why representations display seeming requires abandoning the higher-order approach. |
Abstract
Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion ‘awareness-of.’ I argue that this notion implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind of seeming results in an infinite regress. Finally, highlighting distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether.