Higher-order theories and the explanation of state consciousness
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the self-representational objection to higher-order thought theory either poses no threat (in its weaker form) or applies equally to self-representational theory, entailing a regress of representational properties. |
Abstract
Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness typically claim that conscious experience is a matter of a mental state's being represented by a HOT which is itself normally an unconscious state. Self-representational (SR) theorists have objected to HOT theory on these grounds, citing our constant awareness of our own consciousness, which they claim cannot be explained by appeal to an unconscious HOT (though it can be explained by appeal to self-representing mental states).I consider two interpretations of this objection, one claiming that any content of which we are aware in experience must occur as part of a conscious mental state, and a stronger interpretation according to which the explanation of state consciousness cannot ultimately rest on appeal to unconscious representations. I then argue that in its stronger form, the objection applies equally to SR (entailing a regress of representational properties rather than of mental states), while in its weaker form, it poses no threat to HOT theory.