Higher-order theories and the explanation of state consciousness

Self-representational theories of consciousness object to Higher-order Thought (HOT) theory because HOT theory explains conscious experience through an unconscious higher-order thought, which seems incompatible with our constant awareness of our own consciousness. This paper examines two interpretations of that objection. Under the weaker interpretation, the objection poses no real threat to HOT theory. Under the stronger interpretation, the objection applies equally to self-representational theories, leading to a regress of representational properties rather than mental states. The argument thus defends HOT theory against a common criticism by showing the objection either fails or equally undermines the alternative.

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Abstract

Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness typically claim that conscious experience is a matter of a mental state's being represented by a HOT which is itself normally an unconscious state. Self-representational (SR) theorists have objected to HOT theory on these grounds, citing our constant awareness of our own consciousness, which they claim cannot be explained by appeal to an unconscious HOT (though it can be explained by appeal to self-representing mental states).I consider two interpretations of this objection, one claiming that any content of which we are aware in experience must occur as part of a conscious mental state, and a stronger interpretation according to which the explanation of state consciousness cannot ultimately rest on appeal to unconscious representations. I then argue that in its stronger form, the objection applies equally to SR (entailing a regress of representational properties rather than of mental states), while in its weaker form, it poses no threat to HOT theory.