Of integrated information theory: a philosophical evaluation

Abstract

ABSTRACT Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) explains consciousness as integrated information (Φ), that is, the informational state produced by the whole system over the sum of its parts. Many philosophers are drawn to IIT, for it offers a way to explain consciousness in a systematic mathematical form. In this paper, I assess whether IIT satisfies the demands of philosophers. I argue that IIT cannot address the “hard problem” of consciousness. In particular, even though IIT is not a standard form of functionalism, some arguments against functionalism (such as absent qualia and inverted spectrum) can be adapted to refute IIT. Besides the concern about the hard problem, I also argue that IIT implies that consciousness is epiphenomenal, and that consciousness identified with integrated information is not a fundamental property. Despite Tononi’s claim to the contrary, integrated information is not ontologically fundamental because it is grounded in the causal relations within a system.