Research on the neural basis of consciousness has largely focused either on where and when neural activity represents conscious contents, or on the interactions through which distributed neural populations become integrated. We argue that these approaches can be connected by analysing information relations among neural representations. A perceptual content can be synergistic when it is carried...
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is uniquely ambitious in proposing a mathematical formula, derived from apparently fundamental properties of conscious experience, to describe the quantity and quality of consciousness for any physical system that possesses it. IIT has generated considerable debate, which has engendered some misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Here...
The rapid advances in the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have galvanised public and scientific debates over whether artificial systems might one day be conscious. Prevailing optimism is often grounded in computational functionalism: the assumption that consciousness is determined solely by the right pattern of information processing, independent of the physical substrate. Opposing...
Conscious experience depends on the coordinated activity of neural processes that span multiple scales: from synapses to whole-brain dynamics. A recently introduced measure, dynamical independence (DI), identifies, characterises, and quantifies these multi-scale relationships using an information-theoretic dimensionality reduction approach. Here, we use DI to examine changes in the emergent...
Conscious experience depends on the coordinated activity of neural processes that span multiple scales—from synapses to whole-brain dynamics. A recently introduced measure, dynamical independence, identifies, characterises and quantifies these multi-scale relationships using an information-theoretic dimensionality-reduction approach. Here, we use DI to examine changes in emergent dynamical...