Current Psychology
September 30, 2021
Anna-Lena Lumma, Ulrich Weger
41 citations
Psychological research relies heavily on self-report and behavioral measures collected by an experimenter, but first-person methods that capture subtle facets of subjective experience are less common. Without these measures, fundamental aspects of psychological phenomena remain inaccessible to theory. This article reviews established first-person methods, compares them on relevant dimensions, and helps researchers select suitable methods for studying subjective experience. Integrating first-person perspectives can complement and enrich third-person research.
Advances in Cognitive Psychology
December 1, 2018
Johannes Wagemann, F. Edelhäuser, Ulrich Weger
18 citations
The mind–brain problem remains unresolved. By examining neurophilosophical and neuropsychological positions, the problem can be reframed as a structural relation between methodological and content-related aspects, which highlights the need for a new balance between separating and integrating elements. As an alternative, Rudolf Steiner's approach is investigated, which includes a first-person method and the mirror metaphor—the brain as necessary but not sufficient for mental activity. A first-person study using volitionally controlled perceptual reversals reveals a phenomenological distinction between engaging and disengaging forms of mental activity. This initiates discussion of related philosophical concepts and outlines next research steps.
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology
February 1, 2023
Terje Sparby, Mira Leass, Ulrich Weger et al.
8 citations
Training people to use micro-phenomenological self-inquiry can improve their ability to describe the fine details of headache experiences, including distinguishing the sensation of pain from the experience of suffering. Thirteen untrained subjects met twice in one week to investigate their headache experiences using this method. Their reports became richer, as shown by more categories described and more words needed for accurate description. The method allows deep focus on single moments of experience but may miss broader contextual meanings. The authors suggest the approach could be useful in clinical settings with initially untrained subjects for describing specific experiences and answering complex phenomenological questions.
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology
December 1, 2021
Terje Sparby, Anna-Lena Lumma, Friedrich Edelhäuser et al.
5 citations
Micro-phenomenology is a technique for improving first-person reports of experience, typically conducted with a second-person interviewer. A self-inquiry format, using a guiding document without an interviewer, offers time and cost advantages but its reliability for untrained subjects was unknown. This study attempted to replicate a previous experiment that tested whether micro-phenomenology increases report reliability. The replication failed. Possible explanations include a methodological weakness in the original study, ineffectiveness of the self-inquiry format used here, or that micro-phenomenological self-inquiry requires training. The authors conclude that the self-inquiry format is insufficient for conducting micro-phenomenological studies and that training is necessary.
Frontiers in Psychology
March 12, 2024
Terje Sparby, Dirk Cysarz, David Hornemann V. Laer et al.
1 citation
Attentional control has two basic aspects: directing attention to different objects is experienced as easy and a sign of freedom, while sustaining attention on a chosen object is difficult because mind-wandering is inevitable. This raises the question of whether we are fundamentally unfree. An introspective study with six people performing various attention tasks over a month examined whether it is possible to experience the source of attention—the subject enacting freedom through attention. Common and contrasting experiences are reported, forming a basis for discussing the method of introspection and how to handle conflicting reports.
Mindfulness
April 1, 2024
Brentyn J. Ramm, Anna-Lena Lumma, Terje Sparby et al.
Twelve of twenty adults who had never practiced the Headless Way exercises reported a void-like experience after being guided through them, and five reported an experience of awareness itself. These experiences were categorized as subsets of perceptual absences and the sense of not being person-like. The exercises can effectively induce experiences of emptiness and awareness in participants without prior meditation experience. The findings suggest that such experiences can be elicited outside a traditional meditation context, and that the sense of not being person-like and perceptual absences may be precursors to recognizing awareness itself and the void-like nature of the mind.
Acta Psychologica
July 1, 2026
Terje Sparby, Torbjørn Eftestøl, Markus Lindholm et al.
A recent taxonomy of philosophies of mind classifies Rudolf Steiner's view as mind-body dualism, but this classification is incorrect. Steiner's view is trinitarian, representing a unification of monism and dualism. This trinitarian conception challenges the taxonomy's placement of Steiner and suggests a potential fundamental limitation of the whole taxonomy, as monism and dualism may not be exclusive. Other thinkers such as Whitehead and de Chardin may also be trinitarian, indicating the taxonomy needs revision. The dualism versus monism debate mirrors limitations in current thinking. The trinitarian view offers a different approach to the hard problem of consciousness, understanding mind-body differentiation as part of human development.
Psychological Research
March 1, 2018
Andreas Meyer, Benedikt Hackert, Ulrich Weger
The emergence of psychology as an academic discipline over a century ago brought a paradigm shift that enabled rigorous, experimentation-based study of psychological phenomena but also alienated researchers from the experiential, or qualia, aspects of those phenomena, as inquiry increasingly relied on third-person measures such as behavioral or physiological observations. At this turning point stood the European scholar Franz Brentano, who advocated for a synthesis of both third-person and first-person research methods. On the centenary of his death, this article outlines the historical context, introduces Brentano's approach and work, and discusses its relevance for contemporary experimental psychology.
Melina Schwab, Ulrich Weger, Terje Sparby
Meditation's role in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is debated: evidence mostly shows benefit, but risks may exist. This qualitative study, the first to examine meditation combined with psychotherapy for PTSD, interviewed 11 people—PTSD sufferers and psychotherapists—about their experiences. Six themes emerged: background, deductively identified effects, PTSD symptom groups, inductively constructed effects, negative effects and challenges, dealing with them, and effects on the psychotherapeutic process. Descriptions of transformative processes and mechanisms of action included both positively and negatively perceived effects. The findings suggest greater sensitivity is needed when using meditation in PTSD contexts, for both individuals and clinicians.