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Melanie Boly

University of Wisconsin–Madison

51 papers in the library · 9,994 citations · publishing 2006-2026

Papers

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The spectral exponent of the resting EEG indexes the presence of consciousness during unresponsiveness induced by propofol, xenon, and ketamine

Neuroimage January 11, 2019 Michele A. Colombo, Martino Napolitani, Melanie Boly et al. 359 citations

Despite the absence of responsiveness during anesthesia, conscious experience may persist. However, reliable, easily acquirable and interpretable neurophysiological markers of the presence of consciousness in unresponsive states are still missing. A promising marker is based on the decay-rate of the power spectral density (PSD) of the resting EEG. We acquired resting electroencephalogram (EEG)...

Evoked Alpha Power is Reduced in Disconnected Consciousness During Sleep and Anesthesia

Scientific Reports November 5, 2018 Matthieu Darracq, Chadd M. Funk, Daniel Polyakov et al. 49 citations

Sleep and anesthesia entail alterations in conscious experience. Conscious experience may be absent (unconsciousness) or take the form of dreaming, a state in which sensory stimuli are not incorporated into conscious experience (disconnected consciousness). Recent work has identified features of cortical activity that distinguish conscious from unconscious states; however, less is known about...

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses.

The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience November 8, 2017 Johan F. Storm, Melanie Boly, Adenauer G. Casali et al.

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in...

Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence

Journal of Neuroscience October 4, 2017 Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya et al. 591 citations

The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues. Dual Perspectives Companion Paper: Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of...

The Phenomenal Contents and Neural Correlates of Spontaneous Thoughts across Wakefulness, NREM Sleep, and REM Sleep

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience May 31, 2017 Lampros Perogamvros, Benjamin Baird, Mitja Seibold et al. 76 citations

Thoughts occur during wake as well as during dreaming sleep. Using experience sampling combined with high-density EEG, we investigated the phenomenal qualities and neural correlates of spontaneously occurring thoughts across wakefulness, non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep, and REM sleep. Across all states, thoughts were associated with activation of a region of the midcingulate cortex....

Stratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity

Annals of Neurology September 22, 2016 Silvia Casarotto, Angela Comanducci, Mario Rosanova et al. 504 citations

OBJECTIVE: Validating objective, brain-based indices of consciousness in behaviorally unresponsive patients represents a challenge due to the impossibility of obtaining independent evidence through subjective reports. Here we address this problem by first validating a promising metric of consciousness-the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI)-in a benchmark population who could confirm the...

Resting-state Network-specific Breakdown of Functional Connectivity during Ketamine Alteration of Consciousness in Volunteers

Anesthesiology August 9, 2016 Vincent Bonhomme, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Athena Demertzi et al. 206 citations

BACKGROUND: Consciousness-altering anesthetic agents disturb connectivity between brain regions composing the resting-state consciousness networks (RSNs). The default mode network (DMn), executive control network, salience network (SALn), auditory network, sensorimotor network (SMn), and visual network sustain mentation. Ketamine modifies consciousness differently from other agents, producing...

Consciousness and cortical responsiveness: a within-state study during non-rapid eye movement sleep

Scientific Reports August 5, 2016 Jaakko O. Nieminen, Olivia Gosseries, Marcello Massimini et al. 60 citations

When subjects become unconscious, there is a characteristic change in the way the cerebral cortex responds to perturbations, as can be assessed using transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS-EEG). For instance, compared to wakefulness, during non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep TMS elicits a larger positive-negative wave, fewer phase-locked oscillations, and an overall...

Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems

Nature reviews. Neuroscience April 20, 2016 Christof Koch, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly et al. 1,654 citations

There have been a number of advances in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness--the minimum neural mechanisms sufficient for any one specific conscious percept. In this Review, we describe recent findings showing that the anatomical neural correlates of consciousness are primarily localized to a posterior cortical hot zone that includes sensory areas, rather than to a...

Stimulus Set Meaningfulness and Neurophysiological Differentiation: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

PLoS One May 13, 2015 Melanie Boly, Shuntaro Sasai, Olivia Gosseries et al. 69 citations

A meaningful set of stimuli, such as a sequence of frames from a movie, triggers a set of different experiences. By contrast, a meaningless set of stimuli, such as a sequence of 'TV noise' frames, triggers always the same experience--of seeing 'TV noise'--even though the stimuli themselves are as different from each other as the movie frames. We reasoned that the differentiation of cortical...

Quantifying Cortical EEG Responses to TMS in (Un)consciousness

Clinical EEG and Neuroscience 2014 Simone Sarasso, Mario Rosanova, Adenauer G. Casali et al. 164 citations

We normally assess another individual's level of consciousness based on her or his ability to interact with the surrounding environment and communicate. Usually, if we observe purposeful behavior, appropriate responses to sensory inputs, and, above all, appropriate answers to questions, we can be reasonably sure that the person is conscious. However, we know that consciousness can be entirely...

A Theoretically Based Index of Consciousness Independent of Sensory Processing and Behavior

Science Translational Medicine August 14, 2013 Adenauer G. Casali, Olivia Gosseries, Mario Rosanova et al. 1,299 citations

One challenging aspect of the clinical assessment of brain-injured, unresponsive patients is the lack of an objective measure of consciousness that is independent of the subject's ability to interact with the external environment. Theoretical considerations suggest that consciousness depends on the brain's ability to support complex activity patterns that are, at once, distributed among...

Neural correlates of consciousness during general anesthesia using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

February 26, 2013 Vincent Bonhomme, Pierre Boveroux, J. F. Brichant et al. 71 citations

This paper reviews the current knowledge about the mechanisms of anesthesia-induced alteration of consciousness. It is now evident that hypnotic anesthetic agents have specific brain targets whose function is hierarchically altered in a dose-dependent manner. Higher order networks, thought to be involved in mental content generation, as well as sub-cortical networks involved in thalamic...

Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions

Frontiers in Psychology 2013 Melanie Boly, Anil K. Seth, Melanie Wilke et al. 295 citations

This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent...

Hierarchical clustering of brain activity during human nonrapid eye movement sleep

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences March 26, 2012 Melanie Boly, Vincent Perlbarg, Guillaume Marrelec et al. 201 citations

Consciousness is reduced during nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep due to changes in brain function that are still poorly understood. Here, we tested the hypothesis that impaired consciousness during NREM sleep is associated with an increased modularity of brain activity. Cerebral connectivity was quantified in resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging times series acquired in 13...

"Relevance vector machine" consciousness classifier applied to cerebral metabolism of vegetative and locked-in patients.

Neuroimage May 15, 2011 Christophe Phillips, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Pierre Maquet et al.

The vegetative state is a devastating condition where patients awaken from their coma (i.e., open their eyes) but fail to show any behavioural sign of conscious awareness. Locked-in syndrome patients also awaken from their coma and are unable to show any motor response to command (except for small eye movements or blinks) but recover full conscious awareness of self and environment. Bedside...

Preserved feedforward but impaired top-down processes in the vegetative state.

Science (New York, N.Y.) May 13, 2011 Melanie Boly, Marta Isabel Garrido, Olivia Gosseries et al.

Frontoparietal cortex is involved in the explicit processing (awareness) of stimuli. Frontoparietal activation has also been found in studies of subliminal stimulus processing. We hypothesized that an impairment of top-down processes, involved in recurrent neuronal message-passing and the generation of long-latency electrophysiological responses, might provide a more reliable correlate of...

[Neuroimaging technique: a diagnostic tool to detect altered states of consciousness].

Medecine sciences : M/S January 2011 Marie Thonnard, Melanie Boly, Marie-Aurélie Bruno et al.

Vegetative and minimally conscious states diagnosis remained a major clinical challenge. New paradigms such as measurement of the global cerebral metabolism, the structural and functional integrity of fronto-parietal network, or the spontaneous activity in resting state have been shown to be helpful to disentangle vegetative from minimally conscious patients. Active neuroimagery paradigms also...

Breakdown of within- and between-network Resting State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Connectivity during Propofol-induced Loss of Consciousness

Anesthesiology September 30, 2010 Pierre Boveroux, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie-Aurélie Bruno et al. 645 citations

BACKGROUND: Mechanisms of anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness remain poorly understood. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging allows investigating whole-brain connectivity changes during pharmacological modulation of the level of consciousness. METHODS: Low-frequency spontaneous blood oxygen level-dependent fluctuations were measured in 19 healthy volunteers during...

Two Distinct Neuronal Networks Mediate the Awareness of Environment and of Self

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience June 1, 2010 Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Athena Demertzi, Manuel Schabus et al. 460 citations

Evidence from functional neuroimaging studies on resting state suggests that there are two distinct anticorrelated cortical systems that mediate conscious awareness: an "extrinsic" system that encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas and has been linked with processes of external input (external awareness), and an "intrinsic" system which encompasses mainly medial brain areas and has been...

Theoretical approaches to the diagnosis of altered states of consciousness

Progress in Brain Research 2009 Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Giulio Tononi 50 citations

Assessing the level of consciousness of noncommunicative brain-damaged patients is difficult, as one has to make inferences based on the patients' behavior. However, behavioral responses of brain-damaged patients are usually limited not only by their cognitive dysfunctions, but also by their frequent motor impairment. For these reasons, it is essential to resort to para-clinical markers of the...

Consciousness and cerebral baseline activity fluctuations

Human Brain Mapping May 8, 2008 Melanie Boly, Christophe Phillips, Evelyne Balteau et al. 73 citations

The origin of within-subject variability in perceptual experiments is poorly understood. We here review evidence that baseline brain activity in the areas involved in sensory perception predict subsequent variations in sensory awareness. We place these findings in light of recent findings on the architecture of spontaneous BOLD fluctuations in the awake human brain, and discuss the possible...

Intrinsic Brain Activity in Altered States of Consciousness

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences May 1, 2008 Melanie Boly, Christophe Phillips, L. Tshibanda et al. 396 citations

Spontaneous brain activity has recently received increasing interest in the neuroimaging community. However, the value of resting-state studies to a better understanding of brain-behavior relationships has been challenged. That altered states of consciousness are a privileged way to study the relationships between spontaneous brain activity and behavior is proposed, and common resting-state...

Response to Comments on "Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State"

Science March 2, 2007 Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly et al. 72 citations

Additional data, supported by relevant functional neuroimaging literature, confirm that the “normal” patterns of brain activity reported in a patient who was clinically diagnosed as vegetative could not have occurred “automatically” in the absence of conscious awareness. The most parsimonious explanation remains that this patient was consciously aware despite her diagnosis of vegetative state.