What is Time?
September 19, 2017 DOI: 10.4324/9781315269641-18 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that the philosophy of time parallels the philosophy of consciousness, particularly regarding anti-reductionism and eliminativism. Suggests that explicit avowals of anti-reductionism about time are rare because such views are already widespread, and that reductive theories of time face supervenience-based threats analogous to those in consciousness studies. |
Abstract
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness from the easy problems of consciousness. Answering the easy questions might constrain the project of finding out what time is, as answering the question whether rainbows touch the ground might constrain the project of figuring out what rainbows are. The analogy between the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of time doesn&s;t end there. Explicit avowals of anti-reductionism about time are less common, but that probably just reflects the fact that anti-reductionism about time is so widespread that people feel no need to avow it. In the philosophy of time, there is a long tradition of eliminativism, the latest manifestation of which is an argument that takes its cue from developments near the forefront of modern science. Reductive theories of time entail analogous supervenience claims and face an analogous threat.