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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

ISSN 0007-0882

4 papers in the library · 24 citations · publishing 2010-2023

Papers

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A new low: Reassessing (and revising) the local recurrency theory of consciousness

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science September 22, 2023 Benjamin Kozuch 3 citations

Local Recurrency Theory (LR) holds that recurrent loops of neural activity localized to the visual cortex are necessary and sufficient for visual consciousness (if certain background conditions obtain). LR’s popularity has recently waned in favor of theories holding that higher-level types of processing are necessary for consciousness (e.g., the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Higher-order...

Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science August 16, 2021 Cecily M. K. Whiteley 19 citations

First-person reports of Major Depressive Disorder reveal that when an individual becomes depressed a profound change or ‘shift’ to one’s conscious experience occurs. The depressed person reports that something fundamental to their experience has been disturbed or shifted; a change associated with the common but elusive claim that when depressed one finds oneself in a ‘different world’ detached...

DOI: 10.1086/716838 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Download Consciousness Epistemology Library science +1

A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science May 18, 2011 István Aranyosi 2 citations

In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by...

The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science September 1, 2010 N. Shea, Tim Bayne

Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are...