Psychosis may stem from altered predictive coding in the brain, where prior beliefs are combined with sensory signals to interpret the world. The canonical account suggests that weakened prior beliefs relative to sensory data lead to maladaptive inferences. However, evidence is mixed: some studies find weakened priors, others stronger priors. Hallucinations and delusions may involve distinct predictive coding alterations. Challenges include non-uniform deficits across sensory modalities, hierarchical processing where lower and higher levels interact non-linearly, and the role of active inference—anticipating how actions affect sensations. Considering these complexities could reconcile conflicting findings and yield a more comprehensive framework for psychosis.
The subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot is investigated to test three theories of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing Neurorepresentationalism (NREP). IIT predicts that the blind spot region, lacking feedforward input from one eye, should contribute differently to perceived spatial quality. The Predictive Processing accounts argue that internal models accommodate structural deviations based on sensory evidence. Participants evaluate distances, areas, and illusory motion with or without the blind spot involved. Psychometric models quantify bias and precision in perceived versus objective space. Simulated results correspond to each theory's predictions, and challenges for dissemination are discussed.